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R. Impagliazzo and A. Wigderson (1997, in ‘‘Proceedings of the twenty-
ninth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,’’ pp. 220229)
have recently shown that if there exists a decision problem solvable in time
2O(n) and having circuit complexity 20(n) (for all but finitely many n) then
P=BPP. This result is a culmination of a series of works showing connec-
tions between the existence of hard predicates and the existence of good
pseudorandom generators. The construction of Impagliazzo and Wigderson
goes through three phases of ‘‘hardness amplification’’ (a multivariate polyno-
mial encoding, a first derandomized XOR Lemma, and a second deran-
domized XOR Lemma) that are composed with a pseudorandom generator
construction of N. Nisan and A. Wigderson (1999, J. Comput. System Sci. 49,
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149167). In this paper we present two different approaches to proving the
main result of Impagliazzo and Wigderson. In developing each approach, we
introduce new techniques and prove new results that could be useful in future
improvements andor applications of hardness-randomness trade-offs. Our
first result is that when (a modified version of) the NisanWigderson gener-
ator construction is applied with a ‘‘mildly’’ hard predicate, the result is a
generator that produces a distribution indistinguishable from having large
min-entropy. An extractor can then be used to produce a distribution com-
putationally indistinguishable from uniform. This is the first construction of
a pseudorandom generator that works with a mildly hard predicate without
doing hardness amplification. We then show that in the Impagliazzo
Wigderson construction only the first hardness-amplification phase (encoding
with multivariate polynomial) is necessary, since it already gives the required
average-case hardness. We prove this result by (i) establishing a connection
between the hardness-amplification problem and a list-decoding problem for
error-correcting codes; and (ii) presenting a list-decoding algorithm for error-
correcting codes based on multivariate polynomials that improves and
simplifies a previous one by S. Arora and M. Sudan (1997, in ‘‘Proceedings
of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing,’’
pp. 485495).  2001 Academic Press
Key Words: pseudorandom generators; extractors; polynomial reconstruc-
tion; list decoding.
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper continues the exploration of hardness versus randomness trade-offs,
that is, results showing that randomized algorithms can be efficiently simulated
deterministically if certain complexity-theoretic assumptions are true. We present
two new approaches to proving the recent result of Impagliazzo and Wigderson
[IW97] that, if there is a decision problem computable in time 2O(n) and having
circuit complexity 20(n) then P=BPP. Impagliazzo and Wigderson prove their
result by presenting a ‘‘randomness-efficient amplification of hardness’’ based on a
derandomized version of Yao’s XOR Lemma. The hardness-amplification proce-
dure is then composed with the NisanWigderson (NW) generator [NW94] to
yield the result. The hardness amplification goes through three steps: an encoding
using multivariate polynomials (from [BFNW93]), a first derandomized XOR
Lemma (from [Imp95]) and a second derandomized XOR Lemma (which is the
technical contribution of [IW97]).
In our first result, we show how to construct a ‘‘pseudoentropy generator’’
starting from a predicate with ‘‘mild’’ hardness. Roughly speaking, a pseudoentropy
generator takes a short random seed as input and outputs a distribution that is
indistinguishable from having high min-entropy. Combining our pseudoentropy
generator with an extractor, we obtain a pseudorandom generator. Interestingly,
our pseudoentropy generator is (a modification of) the NW generator itself. Along
the way we make the new observation that, when built out of a mildly hard
predicate, the NW generator outputs a distribution that is indistinguishable from
having high Shannon entropy. The notion of a pseudoentropy generator, and the
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idea that a pseudoentropy generator can be converted into a pseudorandom gener-
ator using an extractor, are due to Ha# stad et al. [HILL99].5 Our construction is
the first construction of a pseudorandom generator that directly uses a mildly hard
predicate without hardness amplification.
We then revisit the hardness amplification problem, as considered in [BFNW93,
Imp95, IW97], and we show that the first step alone (encoding with multivariate
polynomials) is sufficient to amplify hardness to the desired level, so that the deran-
domized XOR Lemmas are not necessary in this context. Our proof is based on a
list-decoding algorithm for multivariate polynomial codes and exploits a connection
between the list-decoding and the hardness-amplification problems. The list-decoding
algorithm described in this paper is quantitatively better than a previous one by
Arora and Sudan [AS97], and has a simpler analysis.
An overview of previous results. The works of Blum and Micali [BM84] and
Yao [Yao82] formalize the notion of a pseudorandom generator and show how to
construct pseudorandom generators based on the existence of one-way permuta-
tions. A pseudorandom generator meeting their definitions (which we call a
BMY-type PRG) is a polynomial-time algorithm that on input a randomly selected
string of length n= produces an output of length n that is computationally
indistinguishable from uniform by any adversary of poly(n) size, where = is an
arbitrarily small constant. Pseudorandom generators of this form and ‘‘pseudoran-
dom functions’’ [GGM86] constructed from them have many applications both
inside and outside cryptography (see, e.g., [GGM86, Val84, RR97]). One of the
first applications, observed by Yao [Yao82], was to derandomizationany given
polynomial-time randomized algorithm can be simulated deterministically using a
BMY-type PRG in time 2n
=
} poly(n) by trying all the seeds and taking the majority
answer.
In a seminal work, Nisan and Wigderson [NW94] explore the use of a weaker
type of pseudorandom generator (PRG) in order to derandomize randomized algo-
rithms. They observe that, for the purpose of derandomization, one can consider
generators computable in time poly(2t) (instead of poly(t)) where t is the length of
the seed, since the derandomization process cycles through all the seeds, and this
induces an overhead factor 2t anyway. They also observe that one can restrict to
generators that are good against, adversaries whose running time is bounded by a
fixed polynomial, instead of every polynomial. They then show how to construct a
pseudorandom generator meeting this relaxed definition under weaker assumptions
than those used to build BMY-type pseudorandom generators. Furthermore, they
show that, under a sufficiently strong assumption, one can build a PRG that uses
seeds of logarithmic length (which would be impossible for a BMY-type PRG).
Such a generator can be used to simulate randomized algorithms in polynomial
time, and its existence implies P=BPP. The condition under which Nisan and
Wigderson prove the existence of a PRG with seeds of logarithmic length is the
existence of a decision problem (i.e., a predicate P: [0, 1]n  [0, 1]) solvable in
time 2O(n) such that for some positive constant = no circuit of size 2=n can solve the
problem on more than a fraction 12+2&=n of the inputs (for all but finitely many
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5 To be accurate, the term extractor comes from [NZ96] and postdates the work of Ha# stad et al.
[HILL99].
n). This is a very strong hardness requirement, and it is of interest to obtain similar
conclusions under weaker assumptions.
An example of a weaker assumption is the existence of a mildly hard predicate.
We say that a predicate is mildly hard if for some fixed =>0 no circuit of size 2=n
can decide the predicate on more than a fraction 1&1poly(n) of the inputs. Nisan
and Wigderson prove that mild hardness suffices to derive a pseudorandom gener-
ator with seeds of polylog n length, which in turn implies a quasi-polynomial time
deterministic simulation of BPP. This result is proved by using Yao’s XOR Lemma
[Yao82] (see, e.g., [GNW95] for a proof) to convert a mildly hard predicate over
n inputs into one which has input size poly(n) and is hard to compute on a fraction
12+2&0(n) of the inputs. A series of subsequent papers attacks the problem of
obtaining stronger pseudorandom generators starting from weaker and weaker
assumptions. Babai et al. [BFNW93] show that a predicate of worst-case circuit
complexity 20(n) can be converted into a mildly hard one.6 Impagliazzo [Imp95]
proves a derandomized XOR Lemma which implies that a mildly hard predicate
can be converted into one that cannot be predicted on more than some constant
fraction of the inputs by circuits of size 2=n. Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW97]
prove that a predicate with the latter hardness condition can be transformed into
one that meets the hardness requirement of [NW94]. The result of (IW971 relies
on a different derandomized version of the XOR Lemma than [Imp95]. Thus, the
general structure of the original construction of Nisan and Wigderson [NW94] has
been preserved in most subsequent works, progress being achieved by improving
the single components. In particular, the use of an XOR Lemma in [NW94]
continues, albeit in increasingly sophisticated forms, in [Imp95, IW97]. Likewise,
the NW generator and its original analysis have always been used in conditional
derandomization results since.7 Future progress in the area will probably require a
departure from this observance of the NW methodology, or at least a certain amount
of revisitation of its main parts.
In this paper, we give two new ways to build pseudorandom generators with
seeds of logarithmic length. Both approaches bypass the need for the XOR Lemma,
and instead use tools (such as list decoding, extractors, and pseudoentropy gener-
ators) that did not appear in the sequence of works from [NW94] to [IW97]. For
a diagram illustrating the steps leading up to the results of [IW97] and how our
techniques depart from that framework, see Fig. 1. Both of our approaches are
described in more detail below.
A pseudoentropy generator. Nisan and Wigderson show that when their gener-
ator is constructed using a very hard-on-average predicate, then the output of the
generator is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. It is a natural question
to ask what happens if there are stronger or weaker conditions on the predicate. In
this paper we consider the question of what happens if the predicate is only mildly
hard. Specifically we are interested in whether exponential average-case hardness is
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6 In fact the result of [BFNW93] was somewhat weaker, but it is easily extendible to yield this result.
7 The techniques of Andreev et al. [ACR97] are an exception, but they yield weaker results than those
of [IW97].
FIG. 1. A comparison of our approach with previous ones. Double arrows indicate our results.
really necessary for direct pseudorandom generation. In this paper we first show
that, when a mildly hard predicate is used in the NW generator, then there exists
a distribution having high Shannon entropy that is indistinguishable from the out-
put of the generator. Our main result is then that, for a mildly hard predicate,
a modified version of the NW generator has an output indistinguishable from a
distribution with high min-entropy. Such a generator is essentially a ‘‘pseudoentropy
generator’’ in the sense of Ha# stad et al. [HILL99]. The intuition behind our proof
starts with a result of Impagliazzo [Imp95] which says that if no small circuit can
compute a predicate correctly on more than a fraction 1&$ of the inputs, then
there is some subset of the inputs of density $ on which the predicate is very hard
on average. Due to the high hardness, the evaluation of the predicate in a random
point of this set will be indistinguishable from a random bit. The NW generator
constructed with a predicate P works by transforming an input seed s into a
sequence of points x1 , ..., xm from the domain of P; the output of the generator is
then P(x1) P(x2) } } } P(xm). For a random seed, each of the points xi is uniformly
distributed, and so we expect to typically generate $m points from the hard set, so
that the output of the generator looks like having $m bits of randomness, that is,
it is indistinguishable from some other distribution having (Shannon) entropy $m.
The generation of the points x1 } } } xm can be modified so that the number of points
landing in the hard set is sharply concentrated around its expected value $m. The
output of the modified generator is then indistinguishable from having high min-
entropy. When our generator is composed with a sufficiently good ‘‘extractor’’ (such
as the one in [Tre99]) then the result is a pseudorandom generator. (An extractor
is an algorithm that takes as input a string sampled from a distribution with high
min-entropy, and produces as output a string that is statistically close to uniform.
See Section 3.1 for a formal definition.)
This is the first construction of a pseudorandom generator based on mild
average-case hardness that does not rely on hardness amplification. It is also the
240 SUDAN, TREVISAN, AND VADHAN
first application of the notion of a pseudoentropy generator to the construction of
PRG in the NisanWigderson sense.
Remark 1. While in this paper we analyze for the first time the NisanWigderson
generator under a weaker assumption than the one originally considered in [NW94],
there has also been some work exploring the effect of stronger assumptions on the
predicate. Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW98] show that if the predicate has
certain additional properties (such as ‘‘downward self-reducibility’’) then one needs
only a uniform hardness assumption on the predicate (rather than a circuit-
complexity assumption). Their conclusion is also weaker, obtaining only an average-
case deterministic simulation of BPP for infinitely many input lengths. Arvind and
Ko bler [AK97] and Klivans and van Melkebeek [KvM99] show that if the predicate
is hard on average for nondeterministic circuits, then the output of the generator is
indistinguishable from uniform for nondeterministic adversaries. Therefore it is
possible to derandomize classes involving randomness and nondeterminism, such as
AM. Trevisan [Tre99] shows that if the predicate is chosen randomly from a
distribution having certain properties, then the output is statistically close to uniform.
This yields the construction of extractors that we use in our generator.
The connection with list decoding of error-correcting codes. Our second result
deals with the ‘‘list-decoding problem’’ for error-correcting codes and its connection
to amplification of hardness.
We start by describing a new ‘‘list-decoding’’ problem for error-correcting codes.
This problem differs from the standard decoding task in that (1) the decoding algo-
rithm is allowed to output a list of nearby codewords (rather than a unique nearest
codeword) and (2) the decoding algorithm is allowed oracle access to the received
word, and expected to decode in time much smaller than the length of the
codeword. It is also allowed to output implicit representations of the list of
codewords, by giving programs to compute the i th coordinate of each codeword.
This implicit version of the list-decoding problem is closely related to and inspired
by work in program checking and probabilistic checking of proofs.
We show a simple connection between amplification of hardness and the exist-
ence of (uniformly-constructible) families of codes with very efficient list-decoders in
our sense (Theorem 24). We then show that a recent result of Arora and Sudan
[AS97] on polynomial reconstruction leads to a family of error-correcting codes
with very efficient list-decoders (Lemmas 25 and 28). In particular, this is sufficient
to imply the hardness amplification results of [IW97]. Finally, we simplify the
reconstruction procedure of Arora and Sudan and give an analysis (Theorem 29)
that works for a wider range of parameters and has a much simpler proof. (In
contrast, the analysis of Arora and Sudan relies on their difficult analysis of their
‘‘low-degree test’’ for the ‘‘highly noisy’’ case.)
The polynomial reconstruction problem has been studied for its applications to
program checking, average-case hardness results for the permanent, and random
self-reducibility of complete problems in high complexity classes [BF90, Lip89,
GLR+91, FF93, GS92, FL96, CPS99]. The applicability of polynomial reconstruc-
tion to hardness versus randomness results was demonstrated by Babai et al.
[BFN93]. They show that the existence of a polynomial reconstruction procedure
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implies that one can convert a worst-case hard predicate into one which is mildly
average-case hard by encoding it as a polynomial. In effect, our analysis shows that
already at this stage the polynomial function is very hard, hard enough to use with
the [NW94] pseudo-random generator. This connection between polynomial
reconstruction and hardness amplification has also been observed independently by
Avi Wigderson [Wig98] and S. Ravi Kumar and D. Sivakumar [KS98].
2. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout the paper, all logarithms are with respect to base 2. We write Un for
the uniform distribution on [0, 1]n. Let X and Y be random variables on a discrete
universe U, and let S: U  [0, 1] be any functionalgorithm. We say that S
distinguishes X and Y with advantage = if |Pr[S(X)=1]&Pr[S(Y)=1]|=. The
statistical difference between X and Y is the maximum advantage with which any
function distinguishes them, i.e. maxS/U |Pr[X # S]&Pr[Y # S]|.
Our main objects of study are pseudorandom generators:
Definition 2. A function G: [0, 1]d  [0, 1]n is an (s, =) pseudorandom gener-
ator if no circuit of size s can distinguish G from Un with advantage greater than =.
Our results rely on the NisanWigderson construction of pseudorandom gener-
ators, described below.
2.1. The NisanWigderson Generator
The combinatorial construction underlying the NW generator is a collection of
sets with small intersections, called a design.
Lemma 3 (Design [NW94, Tre99]). For every l, m # N, there exists a family of
sets S1 , ..., Sm /[1, ..., d] such that
1. d=O( l2log m),
2. For all i, |S i |=l, and
3. For all i{ j |Si & S j |log m,
Moreover, such a family can be found deterministically in time poly(m, 2d)
For concreteness, one can think of m=2%l for some small constant %>0, so that
d=O(l)=O(log m). Given such a family of sets, the NW generator takes a
uniformly distributed string of length d and produces m strings of length l. That is,
given parameters l and m, we take the family of sets given by Lemma 3 and define
NWl, m : [0, 1]d  ([0, 1]l)m by
NWl, m (x)=(xS1 , xS2 , ..., xSm),
where xSi denotes the projection of x onto the coordinates specified by Si .
The key property of this generator used in [NW94, IW97] is that the strings xSi
behave as if they are independent when they are used as inputs to a hard function.
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Let P: [0, 1]l  [0, 1] be any predicate. Then the NW pseudorandom generator
using P is a function NW-PRGPl, m : [0, 1]
d  [0, 1]m given by
NW-PRGPl, m(x)=P(x1) P(x2) } } } P(xm), where (x1 , ..., xm)=NWl, m (x).
The main theorem of [NW94] is that if P is taken to be a sufficiently hard (on
average) predicate, NW-PRGPl, m is a good pseudorandom generator.
Theorem 4 [NW94]. Suppose P: [0, 1]l  [0, 1] is a predicate such that no
circuit of size s can compute P correctly on more than a fraction 12+
=
m of the inputs.
Then, NW-PRGPl, m is an (s&O(m
2), =) pseudorandom generator.
The pseudorandom generators produced by this theorem can be spectacular, as
the seed length d=O(l2log m) can be much smaller than (even logarithmic in) the
number of output bits if P is sufficiently hard. The main drawback is that the
hypothesis is also extremely strong (in that P must be very hard on average), and
much work has been done to construct predicates that are strong enough for
Theorem 4 based on weaker assumptions [BFNW93, Imp95, IW97, IW98]. In the
next section, we analyze the quality of this generator when only a mildly hard
predicate is used.
3. PSEUDORANDOM GENERATORS VIA PSEUDOENTROPY
In this section, we show how to build a pseudorandom generator out of a mildly
hard predicate in a different (and arguably more direct) way than [IW97]. Specifi-
cally, we show how to directly build a ‘‘pseudoentropy generator’’ from a mildly
hard predicate and argue that applying an extractor to its output gives a
pseudorandom generator.
3.1. Entropy, Pseudoentropy, and Extractors
The various types of entropy are measures for the amount of randomness in a
probability distribution. If X is a random variable on a discrete universe U, the
(Shannon) entropy of X is defined to be
H(X)=E:  X _log 1Pr[X=:]& .
In Section 3.2, we show that, when a mildly hard predicate is used in the
NisanWigderson pseudorandom generator, the output of the generator is
indistinguishable from having high Shannon entropy. However, later we will need
a stricter measure of entropy. The min-entropy of X is
H (X)=min
: # U \log
1
Pr[X=:]+ .
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In Section 3.3, we show how to modify the NisanWigderson generator to obtain
indistinguishability from high min-entropy. The following definition (following
[HILL99]) formalizes the type of generator we obtain.
Definition 5. A generator G: [0, 1]d  [0, 1]m is a (k, s, =) pseudoentropy
generator if there is a distribution D on [0, 1]m of min-entropy at least k such that
no circuit of size s can distinguish the output of G from D with advantage greater
than =.
The above definition differs from that of [HILL99] in several ways. Most impor-
tantly, we require the output to be indistinguishable from having high min-entropy,
whereas they only require that it be indistinguishable from having high Shannon
entropy. They later convert the Shannon entropy to min-entropy by taking many
samples on independent seeds, but we cannot afford the extra randomness needed
to do this. Other differences are that we ask for indistinguishability against circuits
rather than uniform adversaries, that we do not require that G be computable in
polynomial time, and that we do not explicitly ask that k be larger than d (though
the notion is uninteresting otherwise).
In Section 3.4, we will show that a pseudoentropy generator can be transformed
into a pseudorandom generator using the following type of tool:
Definition 6 [NZ96, NT99]. A function Ext: [0, 1]m_[0, 1]d  [0, 1]n is a
(k, =)-extractor if for every distribution D on [0, 1]m of min-entropy at least k,
Ext(D, Ud) has statistical difference at most = from Un .
We will make use of the following recent construction of extractors:
Theorem 7 [Tre99]. For every m, k, and = such that km, there is a
(k, =)-extractor Ext: [0, 1]m_[0, 1]d  [0, 1]- k such that
d=O \log
2 (m=)
log k +
and Ext: [0, 1]m_[0, 1]d  [0, 1]- k is computable in time poly(m, 2d) (and can, be
computed by a circuit of size poly(m, d )).
3.2. Using a Mildly Hard Predicate
Intuitively, the reason the NW pseudorandom generator works is that whenever
xi is a ‘‘hard instance’’ of P, P(xi) is indistinguishable from a random bit. If P is very
hard as in the hypothesis of Theorem 4, then almost all inputs are hard instances.
Thus, with high probability all the xi ’s will be hard instances and the limited
dependence of the xi ’s guarantees that the P(xi)’s will look simultaneously random.
Now suppose that P is instead only mildly hard, in the sense that no small circuit
can compute it correctly on more than a 1&$ fraction of inputs, for some small but
noticeable $. Intuitively, this means that some $ fraction of the inputs are extremely
hard for P. Thus, we’d expect that a $ fraction of the output bits of NW-PRGPl, m
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are indistinguishable from random, so that we should get some crude pseudoran-
domness out of the generator. In fact, this intuition about hard instances can be
made precise, as shown by the following result of Impagliazzo [Imp95].
Theorem 8 (Hardcore sets [Imp95]). Suppose no circuit of size s can compute
P: [0, 1]l  [0, 1] on more than a 1&$ fraction of the inputs in [0, 1]l. Then, for
every =>0, there exists an =-hardcore set H/[0, 1]l such that |H|=$ } 2l and no
circuit of size s$=0(=2$2s) can compute P correctly on more than a12+= fraction of
the inputs in H.
Using this theorem, we can prove something about the output of NW-PRGPl, m
when a mildly hard predicate P is used. Notice that if x is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom, then each component xi=xSi of the output of NWl, m (x) is uniformly dis-
tributed in [0, 1]l. Hence, the expected number of xi ’s that land in H is $m. Thus,
the earlier intuition suggests that the output of NW-PRGPl, m should have $m bits
of pseudorandomness, and this is in fact true.
Theorem 9. Suppose no circuit of size s can compute P: [0, 1]l  [0, 1] on
more than a 1&$ fraction of the inputs in [0, 1]l. Then, for every =>0, there is a
distribution D on [0, 1]m of (Shannon) entropy at least $m such that no circuit of size
s$=0(=2m2) } s&O(m2) can distinguish the output of NW-PRGPl, m : [0, 1]
d 
[0, 1]m from D with advantage greater than =.
Proof. Let H be a (=$m)-hardcore set for P, as given by Theorem 8. We will
show that the following distribution satisfies the requirements of the theorem.
Distribution D. Choose x uniformly from [0, 1]d. Let (x1 , ..., xm)=NW(x). If
xi # H, select bi # [0, 1] uniformly at random; and if xi  H, let bi=P(xi). Output
b1 } } } bm .
First, we argue that the entropy of D is at least $m. Define *H(x1 , ..., xm) to be
the number of xi ’s that are in H. Then for any x # [0, 1]d, the entropy of D| x (i.e.,
D conditioned on x) is *H(NW(x))). By the definition of the NisanWigderson
generator, each xi is (individually) uniformly distributed and therefore lands in H
with probability $. By linearity of expectations, the expectation of *H(NW(x))
(over uniformly selected x) is $m. Thus, since conditioning reduces entropy (cf.,
[CT91, Th. 2.6.5]),
H(D)Ex[H(D|x)]
=Ex[*H(NW(x))]
=$m.
Now we show that D and NW-PRGPl, m are computationally indistinguishable.
Suppose that some circuit C distinguishes the output of NW-PRGPl, m from D
with advantage greater than =. We will show that C must be of size at least
0(=2m2) } s&O(m2). By complementing C if necessary, we have
Pr[C(NW-PRGPl, m(Ud))=1]&Pr[C(D)=1]>=.
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For x # [0, 1]l and r # [0, 1], define
Q(x, r)={rP(x)
if x # H
otherwise.
Now consider ‘‘hybrids’’ D0 , ..., Dm of D and NW-PRGPl, m(Ud) defined as follows:
Distribution Di . Choose x uniformly from [0, 1]d and choose r1 , ..., rm uniformly
from [0, 1]. For j=1, ..., m, let pj=P(xSj) and q j=Q(xSj , rj) (where Sj and xSj are
as in the definition of NWl, m). Output q1 } } } qi pi+1 } } } pm .
Thus, D0=NW-PRGP(Ud), and Dm=D. By the ‘‘hybrid argument’’ of [GM84]
(cf. [Gol95, Sec. 3.2.3]), there is an i such that
=m<Pr[C(Di&1)=1]&Pr[C(Di)=1]
=$ } Pr[C(Di&1)=1 | xSi # H]+(1&$) Pr[C(Di&1)=1 | xSi  H]
&($ } Pr[C(Di)=1 | xsi # H]+(1&$) Pr[C(Di)=1 | xSi  H])
=$ } (Pr[C(Di&1)=1 | xSi # H]&Pr[C(Di)=1 | xSi # H]),
where the last equality is because Di&1 and Di are identical conditioned on xSi  H.
Expanding and using the fact that qi=Q(xSi , ri)=ri when xSi # H, we have
Prx, ri , ..., rm[C(P(xS1) } } } P(xSi&1) r iQ(xi+1 , ri+1) } } } Q(xSm , rm))=1 | xSi # H]
&Prx, ri+1, ..., rm[C(P(xS1) } } } P(xSi&1) P(xSi) Q(xSi+1 , ri+1) } } } Q(xSm , rm))
=1 | xSi # H]>
=
$m
,
where x is chosen uniformly in [0, 1]d and ri , ..., rm are selected uniformly in [0, 1].
Renaming ri as b and using the standard transformation from distinguishers to
predictors [Yao82] (cf. [Gol99, Sec. 3.3.3]), we see that
Prx, b, ri+1, ..., rm[C(P(xS1) } } } P(xSi&1) bQ(xSi+1 , ri+1) } } } Q(xSm , rm))b
=P(xSi) | xSi # H]>
1
2
+
=
$m
.
Using an averaging argument we can fix ri+1 , ..., rm , b, and all the bits of x outside
Si while preserving the prediction advantage. Renaming xSi as z, we now observe
that z varies uniformly over H while P(xSj) for j<i and Q(xSj , rj) for j>i are now
functions Pj of z that depend on only |Si & S j |log m bits of z. So, we have
Prz [C(P1 (z) } } } P i&1 (z) bPi+1 (z) } } } Pm (z))b=P(z)]>
1
2
+
=
$m
.
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Each Pj can be computed by a circuit of size O(m), since every function of log m
bits can be computed by a circuit of that size (see, e.g., [Weg87, Ch. 4]). Incor-
porating these circuits and b into C, we obtain a circuit C$ of size size(C)+O(m2)
such that Prz [C$(z)=P(z)]> 12+
=
$m .
Now, since H is (=$m)-hardcore for P as in Theorem 8, C$ must have size greater
than 0($2 } (=2$m)2) } s=0(=2m2) } s, and hence C must have size greater than
0(=2m2) } s&O(m2). K
Thus, using a mildly hard predicate with the NW generator, we can obtain many
bits of crude pseudorandomness. A natural next step would be to try to ‘‘extract’’
this crude pseudorandomness and obtain an output that is indistinguishable from
the uniform distribution. Unfortunately, one cannot hope to extract uniformly
distributed bits from a distribution that just has high Shannon entropy. Extraction
is only possible from distributions that have high min-entropy. In the next section,
we show how a small modification to the construction achieves what we need.
3.3. A Pseudoentropy Generator
The reason that we were only able to argue about Shannon entropy in
Theorem 9 is that we could only say that $m xi ’s land in H on average. To obtain
a result about min-entropy, we would need to guarantee that many xi ’s lie in H
with high probability. This would be the case if the xi ’s were generated pairwise
independently instead of via the NW generator. But we also need the special
properties of the NW generator to make the current argument about
indistinguishability work. We resolve this dilemma by taking the XOR of the two
generators to obtain a new generator with the randomness properties of each,
similar to the way Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW97] take the XOR of the NW
generator with a random walk on an expander. That is, we obtain x1 , ..., xm from
a seed x using the NW generator, we obtain y1 , ..., ym pairwise independent from
a seed y, and then use z1=x1 y1 , ..., zm=xmym as the inputs to the predicate
P. As we will prove shortly, this gives a generator whose output is indistinguishable
from some distribution with high min-entropy, as desired.
Recall that we need a way of generating many pairwise independent strings from
a short seed.
Lemma 10 ([CG89]; see also [Gol97]). For any l # N and m2l, there is a
generator PIl, m : [0, 1]3l  ([0, 1]l)m such that for y selected uniformly at random,
the random variables PIl, m ( y)1 , ..., PIl, m ( y)m are pairwise independent. Moreover
PIl, m is computable in time poly(l, m).
Let P: [0, 1]l  [0, 1] be any predicate, let m be any positive integer, and let d
be the seed length of NWl, m . Then our pseudoentropy generator using P is a func-
tion PEPl, m : [0, 1]
d+3l  [0, 1]m given by
PEPl, m(x, y)=P(x1y1) P(x2y2) } } } P(xmym),
where
(x1 , ..., xm)=NWl, m (x) and ( y1 , ..., ym)=PIl, m ( y).
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The following theorem confirms that this construction does in fact yield a
pseudoentropy generator.
Theorem 11. Suppose no circuit of size s can compute P: [0, 1]l  [0, 1] on
more than a 1&$ fraction of the inputs in [0, 1]l. Then, for any m2l,
PEPl, m : [0, 1]
d+3l  [0, 1]m is a (k, s$, =) pseudoentropy generator, with
seed length=d+3l=O(l2log m)
pseudoentropy=k=$m2
adversary size=s$=0(1$2m4) } s&O(m2)
adversary’s maximum advantage===O(1$m).
Moreover, PEPl, m is computable in time poly(m, 2
l2log m) with m oracle calls to P.
Proof. Let =1=1$m. Let H be a (=1 $m)-hardcore set for P, as given by
Theorem 8. Like in the proof of Theorem 9, we consider the following distri-
bution D$.
Distribution D$. Choose x uniformly from [0, 1]d and y uniformly from
[0, 1]3l. Let (x1 , ..., xm)=NWl, m(x) and ( y1 , ..., ym)=PIl, m ( y). If x iyi # H,
select bi # [0, 1] uniformly at random; and if xiy i  H, let bi=P(x iy i). Output
b1 } } } bm .
By an argument as in the proof of Theorem 9, it can be shown that no circuit of
size s$=0(=21 m
2) } s&O(m2)=0(1$2m4) } s&O(m2) can distinguish D$ from
PEPl, m with advantage greater than =1 . The only change needed is that y should be
fixed at the same time as ri+1 , ..., rm , b, and all the bits of x outside Si , and z
should be xSi yi rather than just xSi .
Next we argue that D$ has statistical difference at most 4$m from some distribu-
tion D with min-entropy at least $m2. This will complete the proof with
===1+4$m=O(1$m), as the advantage of any circuit, in distinguishing D from
PEPl, m is at most its advantage in distinguishing D$ from PE
P
l, m plus the statistical
difference between D and D$.
For any w1 , ..., wm # [0, 1]l, define *H(w1 , ..., wm) to be the number of wi ’s that
are in H. As in the proof of Theorem 9, each xiyi is (individually) uniformly dis-
tributed and therefore lands in H with probability $. By linearity of expectations,
the expectation of *H(NWl, m (x)PIl, m ( y)) is $m. Now, since [ yi] are pairwise
independent and independent from x, it follows that [xi y i] are also pairwise
independent. Thus, by Chebyshev’s inequality,
Prx, y _*H(NWl, m (x)PIl, m ( y))<$2&<
$m
($m2)2
=
4
$m
.
Therefore, D$ has statistical difference at most 4$m from the following distribution D:
Distribution D. Choose x uniformly from [0, 1]d and y uniformly from [0, 1]3l.
Let (x1 , ..., xm)=NWl, m (x) and ( y1 , ..., ym)=PIl, m ( y). If *H(x1y1 , ..., xmym)
<$m2, output a uniformly selected string from [0, 1]m. Otherwise, select b1 } } } bm
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FIG. 2. Pseudoentropy Generator+Extractor O Pseudorandom Generator.
as in D$ and output b1 } } } bm . That is, if xi yi # H, select bi # [0, 1] uniformly at
random; and if xiyi  H, let bi=P(xiyi).
Now we argue that D has min-entropy at least $m2. Let v be any string in
[0, 1]m. Then, conditioned on any x and y, the probability that D outputs v is at
most 2&$m2, since in all cases at least $m2 of the output bits of D are selected
uniformly and independently. Thus, Pr[D=v]=Ex, y[Pr[D| x, y=v]]2&$m2, as
desired. K
3.4. Extracting the Randomness
Now we argue that composing a pseudoentropy generator with an (efficient)
extractor yields a pseudorandom generator. The manner of composition is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
Lemma 12. Suppose G: [0, 1]d1  [0, 1]m is a (k, s, =1) pseudoentropy generator
and Ext: [0, 1]m_[0, 1]d2  [0, 1]n is a (k, =2)-extractor computable by circuits
of size t. Then G$: [0, 1]d1+d2  [0, 1]n defined by G$(u, v)=Ext(G(u), v) is a
(s&t, =1+=2) pseudorandom generator.
Proof. Let D be the distribution of min-entropy k that cannot be distinguished
from G(Ud1). Suppose C: [0, 1]
n  [0, 1] is a circuit of size s&t distinguishes
G$(Ud1 , Ud2) from uniform with advantage greater than =1+=2 . By complementing
C if necessary, we have Pr[C(G$(Ud1 , Ud2))=1]&Pr[C(Un)=1]>=1+=2 . Let C$:
[0, 1]m_[0, 1]d2  [0, 1] be the circuit of size s given by C$(x, v)=C(Ext(x, v)).
Then
Pr[C$(G(Ud1), Ud2)=1]&Pr[C$(D, Ud2)=1]
=Pr[C(G$(Ud1 , Ud2))=1]&Pr[C(Ext(D, Ud2))=1]
Pr[C(G$(Ud1 , Ud2))=1]&Pr[C(Un)=1]&=2
>=1 ,
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where the second-to-last inequality follows from the fact that Ext(D, UD2) and Un
have statistical difference at most =2 . Now, by an averaging argument, the second
argument of C$ can be fixed to some v # [0, 1]d2 to obtain a circuit C"(x)=C$(x, v)
of size at most s which distinguishes G(Ud1) from D with advantage greater than =1 .
This is a contradiction. K
Summing up, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 13. There is a universal constant #>0 such that the following holds.
Let P: [0, 1]l  [0, 1] be any predicate such that no circuit of size s can compute
P correctly on more than a 1&$ fraction of the inputs, where s2l and $s&#.
Define n=s# and m=2n2$ and let PEPl, m : [0, 1]
d1  [0, 1]m be the ($m2, 0(1$2m4)
} s&O(m2), O(1$m)) pseudoentropy generator of Theorem 11 and let Ext: [0, 1]m
_[0, 1]d2  [0, 1]n be the ($m2, 1$m)-extractor of Theorem 7. Let PE-PRGP:
[0, 1]d1+d2  [0, 1]n be defined by PE-PRGP(u, v)=Ext(PEPl, m(u), v).
Then, PE-PRGP is a (s$, =) pseudorandom generator with
output length=n=s#
seed length=d1+d2=O \ l
2
log s+
adversary size=s$=- s
adversary$s maximum advantage===O(1n2).
Moreover, PE-PRGP can be evaluated in time 2O(l2log s) with O(n2$) oracle calls to P.
In particular, suppose P is a predicate in E such that no circuit of size s=2%l can
compute P correctly on more than a 1&$=1&1poly(l) fraction of the inputs.
Then tire output length is n=20(l), the seed length is O(l)=O(log n), no circuit of
size s$=20(l) can distinguish the output from uniform, and the generator can be
evaluated in time poly(n), so the resulting pseudorandom generator is sufficiently
strong to obtain P=BPP.
Proof. By Theorem 11,
d1=O \ l
2
log m
+l+O \ l
2
log s+ .
By Theorem 7,
d2=O \log2 \
m
1$m+
log($m2) +=O(log s)O \ l2log s+ ,
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and Ext is computable by a circuit of size t=poly(m, d2)=poly(m). By Lemma 12,
no circuit of size s$ can distinguish the output of PE-PRG from uniform with
advantage greater than O(1$m)=O(1n2), where
s$=0(1$2m2) } s&O(m2)&t0(s1&10#)&poly(s#).
By choosing # sufficiently small, s$ will always be at least - s. K
Remark 14. As mentioned earlier, Ha# stad et al. [HILL99] introduced the
notion of a pseudoentropy generator and showed that the crude pseudorandomness
of such a generator can be extracted to yield a pseudorandom generator. Their
work is in the BlumMicaliYao setting, in which the generators must be com-
putable in time polynomial in the seed length and hence one can only hope for the
output to be polynomially longer than the seed (rather than exponentially, as we
obtain). Hence throughout their construction they can afford super-linear increases
in seed length, whereas preserving the seed length up to linear factors is crucial for
obtaining pseudorandom generators good enough for P=BPP. For example, they
can afford to use randomness-inefficient extractors such as 2-universal hash func-
tions, whereas we require extractors which use only a logarithmic number of truly
random bits, which have only been constructed recently (first in [Zuc96]). Indeed,
the term ‘‘extractor’’ was not even present when the work of [HILL99] first
appeared and the first constructions of randomness-efficient extractors used their
Leftover Hash Lemma as a starting point.
Remark 15. The output of the pseudoentropy generator PEPl, m constructed in
Theorem 11 is actually ‘‘nicer’’ than stated. Specifically, it is indistinguishable from
an oblivious bit-fixing sourcethat is, a distribution on strings of length m in which
m&k bit positions are fixed and the other k bit positions vary uniformly and inde-
pendently. Such sources were the focus of the ‘‘bit extraction problem’’ studied in
[Vaz85, BBR85, CGH+85, Fri92] and the term ‘‘oblivious bit-fixing source’’ was
introduced in [CW89]. To see that the output of PEPl, m is indistinguishable from
an oblivious bit-fixing source, simply observe that the distribution D given in the
proof of Theorem 11 is such a source.8 Extracting from oblivious bit-fixing sources
in which all but k bits are fixed is an easier task than extracting from a general
source of min-entropy k, and already in [CW89] there are (implicitly) extractors
sufficient for our purposes.
Another point about the output of PEPl, m is that its pseudoentropy rate (i.e., the
(pseudo-) min-entropy divided by its length) is at least $2, where P is hard to com-
pute correctly on more than a 1&$ fraction of inputs. This means that if P has
‘‘constant average-case hardness,’’ it suffices to use a good extractor for constant
entropy rate, such as those in [Zuc96, SZ99, Zuc97].
Remark 16. It is natural to ask whether similar ideas can be used to directly
construct BMY-type pseudo-random generators from mild hardness. Specifically,
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8 Actually, D is a convex combination of oblivious bit-fixing sources. Distribution X is said to be a con-
vex combination of distributions X1 , ..., Xt if there is a distribution I on [1, ..., t] such that X can be
realized by choosing i # [1, ..., t] according to I, taking a sample x from Xi , and outputting x. It is easy
to see that any extractor for oblivious bit-fixing sources also works for convex combinations of them.
consider a modification of the BMY-construction [BM84, Yao82] of pseudoran-
dom generators from strong (i.e., very hard-on-average) one-way permutations,
replacing the strong one-way permutation with a weak (i.e., mildly hard-on-
average) one. In analogy with Theorem 9, one might hope that the resulting gener-
ator has output which is indistinguishable from having high Shannon entropy.
Unfortunately, this is not the case in general, at least not to the extent one might
expect.
To see this, let us recall the BMY construction. Let f: [0, 1]n  [0, 1]n be a one-
way permutation, and let b: [0, 1]n  [0, 1] be a hardcore predicate for f, so no
polynomial-time algorithm can predict b(x) from f (x) with inverse-polynomial
advantage over the choice of x. Then the generator Gf, b : [0, 1]n  [0, 1]k is
defined by Gf, b (x)=b(x) b( f (x)) b( f 2 (x)) } } } b( f k&1 (x)). It is shown in [BM84,
Yao82] that, as long as k=nO(1), the output of Gf, b cannot be distinguished from
uniform by any polynomial-time algorithm.
Now we show how to construct a weak one-way permutation F (and a predicate
B so that B(x) is mildly unpredictable from F(x)) for which the output of GF, B is
distinguishable from every distribution of high Shannon entropy. To construct F,
let f : [0, 1]n  [0, 1]n be a strong one-way permutation with hardcore bit
b: [0, 1]n  [0, 1] as above. Let t=Wlog 2nX. F will be a permutation on strings of
length n+t where the last t bits are viewed as an integer from 0 to 2t&1. For
x # [0, 1]n and i # [0, ..., 2t&1], we define
F(x, i)={(x, i+1) (mod 2
t)
( f (x), i+1) (mod 2t)
if i # [0, ..., n&1]
otherwise.
B(x, i)={xi+1b(x)
if i # [0, ..., n&1]
otherwise,
where xi+1 denotes the i+1’st bit of x. It is easy to verify that no polynomial-time
algorithm can invert F on more than, say, 34 of the inputs and similarly B(x, i)
cannot be predicted from F(x, i) with probability greater than, say, 78. On the
other hand, from the first 2t+n bits of GF, B(x, i), it is easy to predict the remaining
bits with probability 1: 2t+n successive applications of F always pass through a
sequence of points of the form ( y, 0), ( y, 1), ..., ( y, n & 1), during which the
hardcore bits completely reveal y. All further applications of F and B are then poly-
nomial-time computable given y. Therefore the output of GF, B is distinguishable
from any distribution with Shannon entropy greater than 2t+n=O(n), whereas an
analogy with Theorem 9 would expect indistinguishability from Shannon entropy
k8 (since B cannot be predicted with probability more than 78). The mild hard-
ness of F and B can be varied in this counterexample by increasing or decreasing
t relative to log n.
4. LIST DECODING AND AMPLIFICATION OF HARDNESS
Recall the main theorem of Nisan and Wigderson (Theorem 4) which states that
given a sufficiently hard-on-average predicate P: [0, 1]l  [0, 1], one can get a
pseudorandom generator. To obtain such a predicate, Impagliazzo and Wigderson
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[IW97] start from a predicate P$ that is hard in the worst case (i.e., no small circuit
computes it correctly on all inputs) and use a low-degree extension of P$ to obtain
a multivariate-polynomial function p^ that is mildly hard on the average (as in
[BFNW93]). They then apply two different XOR lemmas to obtain functions that
grow harder; eventually obtaining as hard a function as required in Theorem 4. We
use an alternate approach for this sequence by showing directly that the function
p^ above is very hard; as hard as required for Theorem 4. (Strictly speaking,
Theorem 4 requires hard Boolean functions. This requirement is weakened, both in
the original result of [IW97] and implicitly in our result, by using the
GoldreichLevin [GL89] construction of hardcore predicates from hard functions.)
In the process, we discover a connection between amplification of the hardness
of functions and efficient decoding of error-correcting codes. In what follows, we
describe the decoding properties that we need, why they suffice for amplification of
hardness, and how multivariate polynomials yield codes with such decoding
properties. For the last part, we use a result of Arora and Sudan [AS97], which
involves a technically hard proof. We also provide a simpler proof of their result,
with some improved parameters. (These improvements are not needed for the
hardness amplification.)
4.1. Notation and Definitions
We will be working with error-correcting codes over arbitrary alphabets. A word
or vector over a q-ary alphabet is simply an element of [q]n. It will often be more
convenient to think of such a vector as a function mapping [n] to [q]. We will
switch between these two representations frequently.
Definition 17. For positive integers n, k, q with nk, an (n, k)q code C is an
injective map from [q]k to [q]n. Elements of the domain of C are referred to as
messages, and elements of the image are referred to as codewords.
For codes to be of use to us, we will need that the codewords are sufficiently ‘‘far’’
from each other. So we define the Hamming distance between two vectors x,
y # [q]n to be the number of coordinates i such that x(i){ y(i). (Notice we are
already using the functional notation!) The relative Hamming distance, denoted
2(x, y), is Pri # [n][x(i){ y(i)].
In the codes that we construct and use, we will expect that any two codewords
are far from each other. But we won’t impose such a restriction explicitly. We will
rather impose a restriction that the codewords allow for recovery, even after many
errors have occurred.
Definition 18. An (n, k)q code C is (=, l ) list-decodable if for every word
r # [q]n, there exist at most l codewords c # C such that 2(r, c)1&(=+ 1q). (In
other words, at most l codewords agree with any word r in a (=+ 1q)-fraction of the
coordinates.) r is referred to as the received word.
Remark 19. Note that the parameter = is expected to be between 0 and 1&1q,
with a smaller = indicating a better code (for any fixed choice of the other
parameters). Note that even at ==0, the fraction of errors allowed is only 1&1q.
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This is an information-theoretic upper limit on the fraction of errors one can
correct (for any meaningful notion of correction) in a q-ary code, since a random
word agrees with any (or even most) codewords in approximately a fraction 1q of
the coordinates. Below, we will initially discuss codes in which q is large and
=r- 1q and then use concatenation to obtain q=2 while = remains close to 0.
Of course, to make these codes useful, we will have some computational
requirements. We will need an infinite family of codes, one for every k, capable of
encoding k letters of the alphabet into some n letters. These codes should be
uniformly constructible, efficiently encodable, and efficiently list-decodable. We will
formalize all these notions in the next definition. Two of these aspects, uniform con-
structibility and efficient encodability are defined along standard lines. However the
third aspect, list-decodability, will not be defined along standard lines. We outline
the non-standard aspects first:
v First, we will not expect the list-decoding algorithm to return one
codeword, but rather a list of up to l codewords such that all nearby codewords are
included in the list. This is natural given our definition of (=, l ) list-decodable codes.
v Next, we will expect the list-decoding algorithm to work in time polynomial
in log k and 1=. This is impossible in a conventional model of computation, since
it takes time at least nk to even read the received word. However (and this is
where the functional view of words becomes important) we will allow the input and
output of the list-decoding algorithm to be specified implicitly. Thus we will assume
we have oracle access to the received word r (the input). We will also output the
codewords implicitly, by programs that compute the function represented by the
codeword. These programs will be allowed to make oracle calls to the received
word r. Thus both our decoding algorithm and their output programs are best
thought of as oracle-machines. We will use the notation MO(x) to denote the com-
putation of an oracle-machine M on input x with access to an oracle O. When ask-
ing for efficient list-decoding, we will expect that the decoding algorithm, as well as
its output programs are an efficient.
v Finally, we will allow our decoding algorithms, as well as their output
programs, to be randomized. Below we define what it means for randomized algo-
rithms to approximately compute functions, and to solve search problems.
Definition 20. A randomized procedure A is said to compute a function
f : X  Y at a point x # X if Pr[A(x)= f (x)]34, where the probability is taken
over the internal coin tosses of A. We say that A has agreement : # [0, 1] with f
if A computes f on : fraction of the inputs in X. We say that A computes f if
it has agreement 1 with f. A randomized procedure A is said to solve a search
problem S, if on input x, Pr[A(x) # S(x)]>34.
Remark 21. Often we want the success probability of randomized procedures to
be higher than the 34 required in the above definition. Although for arbitrary
search problems, there are no generic techniques to reduce error, it will always be
possible to do so in the cases we are interested. For example, in list decoding, where
S(x) is the set of lists which include all nearby codewords, we can amplify by run-
ning the list-decoding algorithm several times and outputting the union of the lists.
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Similarly, for computing functions, a majority vote of several runs can be used. In
both cases, the success probability can be increased to 1&# with an O(log(1#))
slowdown in efficiency. As a consequence, in a nonuniform model of computation
(e.g. circuits) we can set #=1|X| and then fix the coin tosses of A to obtain a deter-
ministic procedure solving the same problem with only a O(log |X| ) slowdown in
efficiency (as in [Adl78]).
We are now ready to define codes that are ‘‘nice’’ for our purpose. These codes
are parameterized by two parameters: an integer k that counts (roughly) the length
of the message to be encoded; and a positive real number = that is related to the
fraction of error from which we expect to be able to recover using list-decoding.
Specifically, we expect that a fraction 1&(=+ 1q) of errors should be efficiently list-
decodable, in a q-ary code.
Definition 22. A family of codes C=[Ck, =] is nice if there exist functions n, q,
l: Z_R  Z and a pair of algorithms (Encode, Decode) satisfying the following
conditions:
1. For every k, =, Ck, = : [q]k  [q]n is an (=, l )-list-decodable code, where n=
n(k, =)poly(k, 1=), q=q(k, =)poly(k, 1=) and l=l(k, =)poly(log k, 1=).
2. Encode(x; k, =) runs in, time poly(n) and returns Ck, = (x), where n=n(k, =).
3. Decoder (k, =) (i.e. with oracle access to a word r # [q]n) runs in time
poly(log k, 1=) and outputs a list of oracle machines M1 , ..., Ml s.t. for every
message x # [q]k satisfying 2(r, Ck, = (x))1&(=+ 1q), there exists j # [l] such that
M rj computes x. Decode as well as the Mj ’s are allowed to be randomized. The
running tine of Mj is bounded by poly(log k, 1=).
A family of codes is binary if q(k, =)=2.
Remark 23. Note that the condition l=l(k, =)=poly(log k, 1=), explicitly
specified in Condition 1, is also implicitly enforced by Condition 3 above, since the
list-decoding algorithm has to be able to enumerate l machines in time
poly(log k, 1=). Thus one could safely drop this part of Condition 1 without chang-
ing the definition.
4.2. Nice Binary Codes Suffice for Amplification of Hardness
We first show that nice binary codes suffice to obtain functions that are as hard
as required for Theorem 4, given any predicate that is hard in the worst-case.
Theorem 24. Let C be a nice family of binary codes. Then there exists a constant
c such that the following is true. Let P: [0, 1]l  [0, 1] be a function such that no
circuit of size s computes P. Given =>0, define P$: [0, 1]l$  [0, 1] by
P$=C2l, = (P).9 Then no circuit of size s$=(=<<)c } s computes the predicate C2l, = (P)
correctly on more than a 12+= fraction of the inputs.
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9 Here we are again viewing messages and codewords as functions. Since the codes are binary, the
functions are Boolean.
In particular, taking ==1s# and assuming l<s# for a sufficiently small constant
# (e.g., #=14c), P$ has the following parameters:
input length=l$=O(l)
adversary size=s$=- s
adversary$s maximum advantage===1s#.
Moreover, P$ can be evaluated in time 2O(l) with access to the entire truth table of P.
Proof. Let k=2l. Assume for contradiction that B is a circuit of size s$=
(=l)c } s that computes C2l, = (P) correctly on more than a 12+= fraction of the
inputs. Then, the decoding algorithm DecodeB(k, =) outputs a list of programs
M1 , ..., Ml such that for some j, M Bj computes P correctly. Since the running times
of the algorithms Mj are bounded by a polynomial in log k and 1=, we can express
MBj as a circuit (with some random inputs) of size at most (l=)
c$ for some constant
c$. This circuit will involve some oracle calls to B. Throwing in the circuit for B in
place of all the oracle calls increases the size of the circuit to at most (l=)c$ } s$.10
By Remark 21, we can get rid of the randomness at the cost of increasing the circuit
size by a factor of O(l$)=O(l) to (l=)c$+1 } s$. Setting c=c$+1, we get the desired
contradiction. K
We prove the existence of nice families of binary codes in two steps. First we
show that multivariate polynomials lead to a nice family of codes over a growing
alphabet. Then we use that to construct a nice family of binary codes.
Lemma 25. A nice family of codes with q(k, =)=poly(log k, 1=), n(k, =)=
poly(k), and l(k, =)=O(1=) exists.
Remark 26. The proof will show that the alphabet size q(k, =) is at least 1=.
This property will be used later.
Proof. The encoding scheme will interpret the message as the values of a multi-
variate polynomial on a specified subset of points. The encoding will be the evalua-
tion of the polynomial at all inputs. Below, we specify the choice of the parameters:
m, the number of variables, F, the field and H, where Hm is the subset of points
where the polynomial is specified by the message.
Given k, =, we pick a field F of cardinality (c log k)2=3 for a constant c to be
determined later; and a subset H/F of cardinality (log k)= and set m=
(log k)(log |H| ). We let q=|F | and associate the set [q] with F. Let b: [k]  Hm
be any injective map. To encode a string x # F k, we find a polynomial p^: F m  F of
degree at most |H|&1 in each of the m variables satisfying p^(b(i))=P(i) for every
i # [k]. (Such a function does exist and can be found easily. The function may be
made unique by forcing p^(z)=0 for all z # Hm"image(b).) Letting n=|F |m and
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10 For simplicity, we have bounded the number of oracle calls by the running time, which in turn we
have made a polynomial of unspecified degree in log k and 1=. Clearly, to obtain quantitatively better
results, one should optimize and compute the number of oracle calls to the received word in the decod-
ing procedure, as this is the only part of the running time which affects the circuit size multiplicatively.
associating [n] with F m, the encoding of x is simply the polynomial function
p^: [n]  F. Note that, with these settings,
log n=m } log |F |=
(log k) } (log |F | )
log |H|
=O(log k),
since log |F |=O(log |H| ). Thus n=poly(k), as claimed.
The uniform constructibility and efficient encoding properties are standard. The
decoding problem reduces to a ‘‘polynomial reconstruction’’ problem: Given oracle
access to a function f: F m  F, (implicitly) find a list of all total degree d polyno-
mials that agree with f on at least an =+ 1|F | fraction of the places. Arora and Sudan
[AS97] give an efficient solution to this problem. In Theorem 29, we give a simpler
algorithm and analysis with improved parameters. In particular, the theorem gives
a solution to this problem provided =+1|F |c - d|F |, for some choice of the
constant c. We need only verify that this condition is satisfied for the choice of
parameters above. With our choice of parameters,
d
|F |
<
m } |H|
|F |

(log k) } (log k)=
(c log k)2=3
=
=2
c2
,
so the required condition is met. The algorithm of Theorem 29 runs in time
poly(m, d, log |F |, 1=)=poly(log k, 1=), and produces a list of at most l=O(1=)
codewords. K
To convert the codes constructed above into binary codes, we ‘‘concatenate’’
them with the Hadamard code. For a string z # [0, 1]k, the Hadamard encoding of
z is a 2k-bit string Had(z) whose positions are indexed by strings w # [0, 1]k. The
w-th coordinate of the encoding Had(z) is (w, z)= tj=1 wj zj (mod 2), where zj ,
wj # [0, 1] are the coordinates of w and z. Though the Hadamard code is inefficient
with respect to the length of codewords, it does have good list-decoding properties.
Specifically, we use the following well-known bound (cf., [GRS98, Thm. 18]).
Lemma 27. For every k, Had: [0, 1]k  [0, 1]2k is a (=, 1(4=2)) list-decodable
code for all =>0.
Goldreich and Levin [GL89] have given an efficient list-decoding algorithm for
the Hadamard code, which runs in time poly(k, 1=). However, for us, even brute-
force exhaustive search running in time poly(2k) will suffice. By ‘‘concatenating’’ the
codes of Lemma 25 with the Hadamard code and appropriately combining the list-
decoding algorithms, we obtain the following.
Lemma 28. There exists a nice family of binary codes with parameters n=
poly(k=) and l=poly(1=).
Proof. Let C be the code as given by Lemma 25. We obtain a nice family of
binary codes C$ as follows.
Given k and =, first set $==34 and let (n, q, l ) be the parameters of the code
Ck, $ . (In particular, q>1$). Let t=Wlog2 qX, and let b: [q]  [0, 1]t be any injec-
tive map; for z # [q], we will write Had(z) as shorthand for Had(b(z)). To encode
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a string x # [0, 1]k, we first encode it using Ck, $ to get y=Ck, $ (x) # [q]n. Then we
encode each coordinate of y as a 2t-bit string using the Hadamard code. Thus the
concatenated encoding encodes a k-bit vector x as a vector
Had( y(1)) Had( y(2)) } } } Had( y(n)), where y=Ck, $ (x) # [q]n.
Clearly, the encoding is of length n$=n } 2tn } (2q)=poly(k, 1=) bits. It is also
clear that the encoding for the concatenated code can be computed efficiently.
We now describe its decoding. The decoding proceeds using the usual paradigm
for the decoding of concatenated codes. We first decode each symbol of the ‘‘inner’’
code, i.e., the Hadamard code; and then decode the ‘‘outer code’’; in each case we
use the respective decoding algorithm. The details that need to be verified are:
(1) We need to specify the decoding algorithm for the Hadamard code. (2) We have
to implement the decoding paradigm with inputoutputs being implicit. (3) While
decoding the inner-code, we don’t get unique answers but rather a list of
codewords. We need a list-decoding version of the decoding procedure.
Given k, =, and an oracle for the received word r: [n]_[2t]  [0, 1], we imple-
ment oracles r$1 , r$2 , ..., r$1=2 : [n]  [q] as follows. Given i # [n], we consider the
oracle r| i : [2t]  [0, 1] given by r| i ( j)=r(i, j). We find a list of all elements
z # [q] such that Had(z) has agreement at least 12+=2 with r| i . By Lemma 27,
this list has at most 1=2 elements. The oracle r$m , on query i, outputs the m th ele-
ment of this list (after sorting them using some canonical order, such as the
lexicographic order). We then invoke the list decoding algorithm for Ck, $ 1=2 times,
once for each r$m , and take the union of the lists obtained. Thus, the resulting list
is of length at most l } (1=2)=poly(1=).
To analyze the correctness of our decoding algorithm, consider a message x such
that C$k, = (x) has 12+= agreement with r. Let y=Ck, $ (x). An application of
Markov’s inequality yields that for at least =2 fraction of the indices i # [n], r| i has
at least 12+=2 agreement with Had( y(i)), and therefore r| i=r$m (i) for some j.
Since there are only 1=2 choices for m, it follows by averaging that there exists a
m0 such that r$m&0 (i)=r| i for at least a fraction (=2) } =2==32 of the indices i # [n].
Since 1q+$2$==32, the list-decoding algorithm for Ck, $ will produce a list of
up to l=poly(1=) oracles which includes x. K
Comparison with [IW97]. Theorem 24 and Lemma 28 provide sufficient hardness
amplification to immediately apply the NisanWigderson construction (Theorem 4)
and obtain the main result of Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW97]. Specifically, if
P is a predicate in E which cannot be computed by circuits of size s=2%l, then P$
given in Theorem 24 will also be in E, and circuits of size s$=20(l$) will not be able
to compute P$ with advantage more than ==2&0(l$). Plugging such a predicate P$
into Theorem 4 gives a pseudorandom generator whose seed length is logarithmic
in its output length and security, and hence implies P=BPP.
In addition, our construction provides hardness amplification for other settings
of parameters that improves over the hardness amplification of [IW97]. Specifi-
cally, the input length of P$ is only a constant factor more than that of P (i.e.,
l$=O(l)), regardless of the security s. In contrast, hardness amplification of
[IW97] produces a predicate with input length 3(l2log s), which is O(l) only if
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s=20(l). Note, however, that our construction does not remove the 3(l2log s)
overhead in seed length incurred when subsequently applying Theorem 4 to obtain
a pseudorandom generator. Obtaining a construction of pseudorandom generators
from hard predicates which increases seed length by only a constant factor for all
values of the security s is still an open problem.11 Our result demonstrates that it
suffices to solve this problem for very hard-on-average predicates. A solution would
have significant implications for the construction of extractors, via the connection
between extractors and pseudorandom generators recently established by Trevisan
[Tre99].
The derandomized XOR lemma of Impagliazzo and Wigderson does have an
important advantage over our hardness amplification technique when one starts
with a mildly-hard predicate rather than a worst-case hard predicate. Specifically,
if P: [0, 1]l  [0, 1] cannot be computed by small circuits on more than a 1&$
fraction of inputs, they obtain a hard-on-average predicate P$ that is computable in
time poly(l, 1$) with oracle access to P. Our construction, on the other hand, does
not take advantage of this mild hardness. Instead, we do a ‘‘global’’ encoding of P,
just as if P were worst-case hard, to obtain a hard-on-average predicate P$ com-
putable in time poly(2l) with oracle access to P. It would be interesting to see if
mild hardness could be amplified ‘‘locally’’ as in [IW97] using techniques based on
error-correcting codes.
4.3. List Decoding of Multivariate Polynomials
Recall that we wish to solve the following problem:
Given: An oracle f: F m  F and parameters d # N and = # R.
Goal: Reconstruct (an implicit representation for) every polynomial of total
degree at most d that has =-agreement with the function f. Specifically, construct
randomized oracle machines M1 , ..., Ml such that for every polynomial p: F m  F of
degree d that has (relative) agreement = with f, there exists j # [l] such that M fj
computes p.
We will be interested in the running time of the ‘‘reconstruction procedure’’, i.e.,
the time taken to generate the machines M1 , ..., Ml , as well as the running times of
the machines M1 , ..., Ml .
Theorem 29. There exists a constant c such that the reconstruction problem
above can be solved in time poly(m, d, log |F |, 1=), provided =>c - d|F |. Further-
more, the reconstruction algorithm produces a list of at most l=O(1=) oracle
machines, each with running time at most poly(m, d, log |F | , 1=).
Remark 30. 1. This theorem is a strengthening of a theorem due to [AS97].
In particular, the lower bound on = here is smaller than that of [AS97], who obtain
an unspecified polynomial in d and 1|F |. Furthermore, our proof is simpler and in
particular does not require ‘‘low-degree testing.’’
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11 We note that this problem has recently been solved by Impagliazzo, Shaltiel, and Wigderson
[ISW00] (though their pseudorandom generators have slightly suboptimal output length).
2. The bound of 0(- d|F | ) is within a constant factor of the bound for the
univariate case. The constant c above is not optimized in this paper. But our
methods can push it down to any constant greater than - 2 (assuming d|F | is suf-
ficiently small). For the univariate case, this constant is 1 [GS99]. No inherent
reason is known for the gap.
Before proving Theorem 29, we recall that polynomials are sufficiently list-
decodable from a combinatorial standpoint (i.e., efficiency considerations aside).
Theorem 31 (cf., [GRS98, Thm. 17]). For any f: F m  F and =- 2d|F |, the
number of total degree d polynomials that have (relative) agreement at least = with
f is less than 2=.
Now we proceed with the proof of Theorem 29. Fix an oracle f: F m  F and a
degree d polynomial p: F m  F with = agreement with f. We observe that it suffices
to reconstruct a (randomized) oracle machine M such that M f has sufficiently high
agreement with p. This is due to the existence of ‘‘self-correctors’’ of polynomials
[BF90, Lip89, GLR+91, GS92]. Specifically, we use the following theorem:
Theorem 32 [GLR+91]. There exists a randomized oracle machine Corr taking
as parameters integers d and m and a field F such that on access to a randomized
oracle M: F m  F with agreement 1516 with some degree d polynomial p, Corr
M com-
putes p in time poly(d, m) provided |F |2(d+1).
As in the algorithms of [BF90, Lip89, GLR+91], we use the properties of ‘‘lines’’
in the m-dimensional space F m, defined below.
Definition 33. The line through x, y # F m, denoted lx, y , is the parameterized
set of points [lx, y(t) =
def
(1&t) x+ty | t # F]. Given a function f: F m  F, f restricted
to the line lx, y is the function f | lx, y : F  F given by f | lx, y (t)=f (lx, y (t)).
Notice that if f is a polynomial of total degree d, then f | lx, y (t) is a univariate
polynomial of degree at most d. Our strategy, to reconstruct the value of p at a ran-
dom point x, is to look at a random line going through x. On this line, p turns into
a univariate polynomial. Furthermore, the random line through the randomly
chosen point x is a ‘‘pairwise independent’’ collection of points from F m. Thus p and
f will have agreement close to = on this line as well. Thus the goal of finding p(x)
‘‘reduces’’ to the goal of reconstructing p restricted to this line, i.e., a univariate
reconstruction problem, a problem that has been addressed in [ALRS99, Sud97,
GS99]. In particular, we use the following theorem.
Theorem 34 [Sud97]. Given a sequence of n distinct pairs [(ti , vi)]ni=1 , ti ,
vi # F and integer parameters d, k, a list of all polynomials g1 , ..., gl of degree at
most d satisfying |[i # [1, ..., n] | gj (ti)=vi]|k, can be reconstructed in time
poly(n log |F | ) provided k>- 2dn.
Using the above theorem and the idea of restricting one’s attention to random
lines, it easy to design an algorithm that, on input x, enumerates a small list of
values that includes p(x) (for most x). However, we need to figure out which one
of these values is p(x). More specifically, we need to ‘‘collate’’ these values and
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assign them to a small collection of oracle machines so one of them consistently
outputs p(x). To do so, the oracle machine needs some additional information
about the polynomial p. (Note that so far, the only information about p that is
known is that it is a low-degree polynomial with =-agreement with fbut there may
be many, at least 0(1=), such polynomials.) We will show that it suffices to know
the value of p at a single (random) point z. Let p(z)=a; we design an oracle
machine Mz, a which now tries to reconstruct the polynomial p. The machine takes
as parameters a positive real number =, integers d and m, and a field F.
v Mz, a(x):
1. (Explicitly) find a list of distinct (univariate) polynomials g1 , ..., gl such
that this list includes all polynomials of degree at most d that have agreement at
least =2 with f | lz, x and does not include any polynomial with agreement less
than =4.
2. If there exists a unique index i # [1, ..., l] such that gi (0)=a, then output
gi (1), else output anything.
Remark 35. 1. Step 1 above can be computed in time polynomial in 1=,
log |F |, m, and d as follows: If F is small enough, then we let t1 , ..., tn be all the
elements of F and invoke Theorem 34 on the set [(ti , f (lz, x(t i)))]ni=1 with k==n2.
(Note that k>- 2dn as long as =>2 - d|F | , which is true by hypothesis.) If F is
too large to do this, then set n=poly(d=) and pick t1 , ..., tn distinct points at ran-
dom from F and then invoke Theorem 34 on the set [(t i , f (lz, x(ti)))]ni=1 with
k==n4. Since there are at most 4= polynomials with agreement at least =2 with
f | lx, z (by Theorem 31), the choice of n guarantees that with high probability, all of
these polynomials agree with f | lz, x on at least =n4 of the ti ’s. As the choice of n also
guarantees that k=(=n4)>- 2dn, Theorem 34 yields a list containing all polyno-
mials with agreement at least =2. Now, we wish to discard all polynomials with
agreement less than =4this can be accomplished by comparing each polynomial
g obtained with f | lz, x on a random sample of poly(1=) points from F and discarding
it if it has agreement smaller than =3 on this sample.
2. By Theorem 31, the number of polynomials output in Step 1 above is at
most 8=.
To shed some light on the steps above, consider the actions of the machine
Mz, a= p(z) : We expect that p| lz, x is one of the gi ’s returned in Step 1 above. In Step 2
we try to find out which gi to use by checking to see if there is a unique one which
has gi (0)=a (recall that p| lz, x(0)= p(z)=a), and if so we use this polynomial to
output p(x)= p| lz, x(1)= g i (1). This intuition is made precise in Section 4.4. We now
finish the description of the reconstruction procedure.
v Reconstruction algorithm
Repeat the following O(log(1=)) times:
1. Pick z # F m at random.
2. Pick y # F m at random.
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3. Find a list of univariate polynomials h1 , ..., hl including all polynomials
of degree at most d with agreement at least =2 with f | lz, y .
12
4. For every polynomial hj , include the oracle machine CorrMz, hj (0) in the
output list.
4.4. Analysis of the Polynomial Reconstruction Procedure
Now we show that the reconstruction algorithm runs in time poly( md= log |F | ) and
outputs a list of oracle machines that includes one for every polynomial p that has
= agreement with f. Theorem 29 follows immediately.
The claim about the running time is easily verified. To analyze the correctness,
it suffices to show that in any iteration of Steps 14 in Reconstruction Algorithm,
an oracle machine computing p is part of the output with, say, constant probability
for any fixed polynomial p of degree d that has = agreement with f. We show this
in two parts. First we argue that for most choices of z, Mz, p(z) is an oracle machine
that computes p on 1516 of all inputs (and thus CorrMz, p(z) computes p everywhere).
Then we show that for most pairs (x, y), there exists j s.t. the polynomial hj
reconstructed in Step 3 satisfies hj (0)= p(z).
Lemma 36. There exists a constant c s.t. for every d, F, = satisfying 1=
c - d|F |, it is the case that
Prx [Mz, p(z) (x)= p(x)]1516,
with probability at least 12 over the random choice of z # F m.
Proof. We first argue that when both x and z are picked at random, certain bad
events are unlikely to happen. The next two claims describe these bad events and
upper bound their probability.
Claim 37. If =256|F |, then
Prx, z [_% i # [l] s.t. gi= p| lz, z]164.
Proof. For the polynomial p| lx, z not to be included in the output list it has to
be the case that p and f do not have =2 agreement on the line lz, x . But the line is
a pairwise independent collection of |F | points in F m. The quantity of interest then
is the probability that a random variable with expectation = attains an average of
at most =2 on |F | samples. Using Chebychev’s inequality, this probability may be
bounded by 4= |F | 
1
64 . K
Claim 38. If =max[4 - 2d|F |, 512d|F |], then
Prx, z [_j # [l] s.t. gj { p| lz, z and p| lz, z(0)= gj (0)]
ld
|F |
164.
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12 This is done as in Remark 35, though here we do not care if the list contains extra polynomials with
low agreement.
Proof. For convenience in this argument, assume that Mz, p(z) finds all polyno-
mials of agreement at least =4 with f | lz, x rather than just a subset, as that is clearly
the worst case for the claim.
The lemma would be obvious if the event in consideration had been considering
a randomly chosen point on the line lz, x , rather than the point lz, x(0). For any
gi { p| lz, x , the probability gi (t)= p| lz, x(t) is at most d|F | for a randomly chosen
t # F, so the probability that there exists an i such that gi { p| lz, x and gi (t)=p| lz, x(t)
is at most l } d|F |.
The only complication is that seemingly t is not being chosen at random, but
rather set to a fixed value t=0. However, this does not really change the analysis.
The polynomials g1 , ..., gl , p| lz, x are only functions of f, p, and the set
L=[lz, x(t) | t # F], rather than on the specific parameterization of the line. So one
could really think of L being picked first, and then the points x and z being chosen
later to be two random points in L. As argued above, the probability (over z # L)
that any of the polynomials g1 , ..., g l agree with p| lz, x at the point lz, x(0)=z is at
most ld | |F |. Since =4- 2d|F |, Theorem 31 gives l<8==|F |(128d ) and the
claim follows. K
Discounting for the two possible bad events considered in Claims 37 and 38, we
find that with probability at least 1&132, there exists a polynomial gi returned in
Step 1 of Mz, p(z) such that gi= p| lz, x ; furthermore, this is the unique polynomial
such that gi (0)= p| lz, x(0)= p(z). Thus the output is gi (1)= p| lz, x(1)= p(x). Thus
with probability at least 3132, we find that for a random pair (z, x), Mz, p(z) com-
putes p(x). An application of Markov’s inequality now yields the desired result. K
Lemma 39. With probability at least 1&164, one of the polynomials recon-
structed in any one execution of Step 3 of Reconstruction Algorithm is p| lx, y ; and thus
one of the oracle machines created in Step 4 is CorrMz, p(z), provided =>256|F |.
Proof. As in Claim 37 we argue that p and f have at least =2 agreement on the
line lz, y and then p| lz, y is one of the polynomials output in this step. Thus one of
the oracle machines created is CorrMz, a for a= p| lz, y (0)= p(z). K
Proof of Theorem 29. Fix any degree d polynomial p with = agreement with f.
Combining Lemmas 36 and 39 we find that with probability 3164, one of the
oracle machines output by the reconstruction algorithm is CorrMz, p(z); and z is such
that Mz, p(z) computes p(x) for at least 1516 fraction of x$s in F m; and thus (by
Theorem 32) CorrMz, p(z) computes p on every input.
By Theorem 31, there are only O(1=) polynomials having at least = agreement
with f. Thus, repeating the loop O(log 1=) times ensures that every such polynomial
p is included in the output with high probability. The list can be trimmed to size
O(1=) by discarding all polynomials having agreement less than =2 with f (which
can be identified via sampling). K
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